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CULTURAL DIVERSITY, IMMIGRATION AND TRADE: 
A STUDY OF NINE OECD HOST COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
Roger White1∗ and Bedassa Tadesse2 
1Department of Economics, Franklin and Marshall College 
2Department of Economics, University of Minnesota – Duluth 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Employing data from nine OECD countries and 67 trading partners for the years 
1996-2001, we examine the inter-relationships between immigration, cultural diversity 
and trade. We find greater cultural differences between immigrants’ host and home 
countries inhibit trade flows. However, immigrants exert pro-trade influences that 
partially offset the effect of cultural distance. We also find that greater cultural diversity 
within the immigrants’ host countries is associated with  the creation of trade between 
immigrants’ host and home countries. The findings suggest that the ability of immigrants 
to influence their host’s trade with their home countries depends, in part, on the 
characteristics of the host country relative to the home country. 
 
 
JEL Classifications: F14, F15, F22. 
 
Keywords: Bilateral Trade, Cultural Distance, Gravity, Immigrants. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Pronounced cultural differences between trading partners can complicate interactions, 
hinder the development of rapport and trust and inhibit trade flows. That trade confers 
benefits to both exporting and importing economies underscores the importance of this 
relationship. We employ data on immigration and trade for nine OECD host countries and 67 
immigrant home countries to consider a relationship between immigration, cultural distance, 
cultural diversity and trade between immigrants’ host and home countries. Examining 
variation in the immigrant-trade relationship across these host countries as well as the 
potential influences of host country cultural diversity and cultural distance, we extend the 
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related literature, inform the public and political discussions of immigration and, potentially, 
provide information that benefits policy formulation. 
Prior studies have reported pro-trade immigrant influences, with immigrants thought to 
increase trade through two primary channels. First, if immigrants arrive in the host country to 
find desired home country products or reasonable substitutes are unavailable, they may 
increase host country imports from their respective home countries. Immigrants’ consumption 
may also expose native-born residents and immigrants from other countries who reside in the 
host country to the home country products. This may produce a consumption spillover effect 
that further increases the host country’s imports from the immigrants’ home countries. 
Immigrants may also possess knowledge of home country markets or of host country 
characteristics that, if successfully exploited, increases trade flows. Dunlevy (2006) labels this 
effect the “information bridge hypothesis”. Greenaway et al. (2007) posit the effect is a 
combination of a “cultural bridge” and an “enforcement bridge”. For example, immigrants’ 
knowledge of home country customs and expected business practices may overcome 
information asymmetries associated with cultural differences. Connections to home country 
business networks may permit the transmission of information about business opportunities or 
the deterrence of opportunistic behavior through a form of reputation-enforcement (Rauch 
and Watson, 2002; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; and Rauch, 2001 and 1999). Bryant et al. 
(2004) liken the abilities of immigrants to reduce trade-related transaction costs by acting as 
trade-intermediaries to the influence of reductions in shipping costs attributable to 
technological improvements.  
A closer look at Greenaway et al.’s (2007) description of the channels through which 
immigrants affect host-home country trade leads to three important questions that are relevant 
for social and economic policy formulation. First, does  cultural difference between the host 
and home countries  inhibit their bilateral trade flows? Second, if so, then do immigrants 
counter the effects of cultural differences? Third, does the degree of cultural diversity in an 
immigrants’ host country affect the abilities of immigrants to offset any trade-inhibiting 
effects of cultural diifferences and, thus, to increase trade? 
Gould (1994), examining US data, first reports evidence of an immigrant-trade link. 
Subsequent studies have identified positive influences of immigrants on trade for several 
other host countries.1,2 In confirming an immigrant-trade relationship, these studies have 
employed a myriad of econometric specifications to explore variation in the immigrant-trade 
relationship across product types (e.g., different industries or sectors, various product types, 
and the degree to which products are homogeneous or differentiated) and home country 
cohorts (e.g., categorized based on relative economic and social development). Further, these 
studies have examined a variety of time periods and diverse sets of home countries. Given 
that the literature relating to the immigrant-trade relationship is quite varied and multifaceted, 
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 Bacarezza et al. (2006) for Bolivia, Combes et al. (2005) for France, Piperakis et al. (2003) for Greece, Hong and 
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we proceed by restricting our attention to those studies that examine the host countries 
included in our data, use aggregate trade data or that emphasize the influence of cultural 
distance on trade. 
Specifically considering the potential effect of cultural distance on US trade with 54 
countries during the 1997-2004 period, White and Tadesse (2008a) employ data from the 
World Values Surveys (WVS) and the European Values Surveys (EVS) to construct a 
measure of US-home country cultural distance. Using both a composite measure of cultural 
distance and two underlying dimensions of cultural differences, separately, the authors report 
that greater cultural differences between the US and the immigrants’ home countries acts to 
inhibit trade flows. Tadesse and White (2007) perform a similar analysis using US state-level 
exports, while Tadesse and White (2008a) consider the influence of cultural distance on US 
state-level exports at both the aggregate level and with trade values decomposed into cultural 
and non-cultural product groupings. These two studies examine exports to 75 countries during 
the year 2000 and conclude that cultural distance does in fact inhibit US state-level exports 
and that cultural products are affected to a greater extent.3 
The work presented here is a complement to the analysis presented in Tadesse and White 
(2008b). The authors explore the influence of cultural distance on trade for the nine OECD 
countries examined in this chapter and report that greater cultural distance, as measured using 
the WVS and EVS data, has a consistently negative and economically significant influence on 
trade. This paper extends Tadesse and White (2008b) to emphasize the role of cultural 
diversity in affecting immigrants’ abilities to influence trade and to determine whether 
immigrants’ pro-trade effects act to counter the expected trade-inhibiting influence of cultural 
differences. 
If a nation’s culture is an amalgam of its population’s shared habits and traditions, 
learned beliefs and customs, attitudes, norms and values, then cultural dissimilarity 
corresponds with host-home country social/institutional dissimilarity and/or information 
asymmetries and that immigrants may offset, in whole or in part, the expected trade-inhibiting 
effects of cultural differences. Further, we anticipate a positive relationship between 
immigrant-trade links and the diversity of a host country since more culturally diverse 
populations are likely more receptive to the introduction of home country products. This 
implies that cultural diversity corresponds with larger consumption spillover effects. 
Similarly, greater diversity within the host country may better enable immigrants to exercise 
their knowledge of and connections to their home countries; thus, increasing the probability 
that immigrants act as trade-intermediaries. 
To address our research questions, we employ data on immigration and trade practices of 
9 culturally and economically heterogeneous OECD host countries with 67 immigrant origin 
(i.e., home) countries during the years 1996-2001. We use data from the WVS and the EVS 
(Inglehart et al., 2004; Hagenaars et al., 2003) to calculate the cultural distances between 
immigrants’ host and home countries. The cultural distance variable is a proxy for the extent 
to which immigrants’ host countries are divergent (culturally) from their home countries. We 
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calculate Simpson Index of Diversity values to estimate the cultural diversity of each host 
country’s population during our reference period. 
We emulate prior studies of the immigrant-trade link by employing a variant of the 
standard gravity equation. With considerable variation across host countries, we find 
immigrants generally increase host country imports from and exports to their respective home 
countries. Further, cultural differences between trading partners inhibit host country imports 
and exports, with imports seemingly affected to a greater extent. We also observe that 
immigrants increase trade flows, perhaps by exploiting superior information regarding host 
country markets (relative to home country counterparts) and home country markets (relative 
to host country counterparts) and by acting as conduits that bridge host-home country cultural 
differences. This finding implies that immigrants play greater roles in facilitating international 
trade than has been discussed in the literature: fully or partially offsetting the influences of the 
lack of trust and commitments that may correspond with greater cultural differences between 
trading partners. 
Greater cultural diversity within the host country population is found to be positively 
correlated with the proportional influences of immigrants on trade. Accordingly, among the 
host countries included in our study, the magnitudes of immigrant-trade links for Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Norway tend to be below-average when compared to the remaining host 
economies in our sample. Each of these countries has fewer immigrants as a share of their 
populations and the Simpson Index of Diversity shows that these host countries’ populations 
are less culturally diverse than are the other host economies in our study. To the contrary, 
estimated immigrant-trade links are significantly larger for Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Sweden and the US. In this later group of host countries, immigrants comprise greater shares 
of the populations and these countries’ populations are more diverse. However, the 
relationship between the cultural diversity of host country populations and the immigrant-
trade link is not entirely straightforward. Estimated links for Italy, for example, are often 
relatively high in magnitude although the Italian population is neither large nor particularly 
diverse. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical specification and details 
both the data and variable construction. Estimation results are discussed in Section 3, and 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. INTUITION AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
The literature suggests that variation across home countries should be expected in terms 
of the existence and magnitudes of immigrant-trade links. Additionally, as immigrant-trade 
links are influenced by host-home country (dis)similarities and historic connections, it seems 
reasonable to expect variation in the immigrant-trade relationship across host countries. To 
consider this possibility, we emulate prior studies of the immigrant-trade relationship and 
employ a variation of the standard gravity equation.4 The gravity equation posits that trade 
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between two countries i and j during year t  increases with the countries’ combined 
economic mass  and decreases with geodesic distance . Higher home country 
GDP  implies greater potential export markets for host country i to serve and an 
increased probability that the host country imports from home country j. Similarly, higher 
host country GDP  signals an increased capacity to both export and import. Geodesic 
distance between the capital cities of host country i and home country j is a proxy for 
transport costs. We also include: , where  is the ratio of the 
immigrant stock from country j residing in country i and the cultural distance between each 
host-home country pairing, and  is a vector containing additional trade-
facilitating/inhibiting factors. Equation (1) thus illustrates. 
 
        (1) 
 
The equation postulates that immigrants and cultural distance exert positive and negative 
influences, respectively, on trade, and that the extent to which cultural distance affects trade 
may be related to the stock of immigrants from country j living in country i. The equation also 
predicts strictly positive realizations of trade values. Trade data often contain cases wherein 
values are equal to zero. Following Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Head and Ries (1998), we 
modify equation (1) to permit realization of zero trade values; thus, yielding equation (2).  
 
     (2) 
 
In equation (2),  is a fixed amount of trade that we subtract from the level predicted by 
equation (1) so that when latent trade values are negative, observed imports and/or exports 
will be zero. Thus, the observed data on country j’s imports from or exports to country i can 
be described as . Substituting this identity, expanding the vector , 
allowing to be the constant of proportionality, taking natural logarithms of the continuous 
variables on both sides of the resulting equation, and assuming that is an identically and 
independently distributed error term results in our estimation equation. To capture potential 
variation in the influences of immigrants across host countries, we include a series of terms 
that interact the immigrant stock, cultural distance and host country dummy variables. 
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    (3) 
 
Our vector of dependent variable includes aggregate imports and exports as well as 
disaggregated (manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors and 1-digit SITC sectors) 
import and export values, each of which is regressed on the set of explanatory variables. 
Trade data are from the SourceOECD Database. As i represents each host country, the 
corresponding GDP values do not vary across trading partners; the effects are thus subsumed 
into the coefficients on the host country-specific and time dummy variables. 
The immigrant stock from home country j residing in host country i during year t, , 
controls for immigrants’ effects on host-home country trade. The corresponding coefficient,
, partially captures the influence of immigrants in that the coefficient represents a “base 
effect” that applies equally across host-home country pairs. The coefficients on the
variables represent the effects of cultural distance, while coefficients on the variables 
capture variation in trade flows, all else equal, across host countries. We expect coefficients 
on the and variables to be positive and negative, respectively. We also include a 
term which interacts the , and  variables. Thus, the sum of the 
coefficients on the immigrant stock variable and the corresponding interaction term,
, 
give the influence of immigrants on trade. Immigrant stock data are from national statistic 
agencies and have been compiled by the Migration Policy Institute (2007).5 Data for six of the 
nine host countries in our data set are complete in that the statistical agency provides annual 
values for the years 1996-2001.6  
Annual changes in the host-home country exchange rate ( ), given as 
home country currency units per host country currency unit, represents terms of trade effects. 
An increase in the variable signals a depreciation of the home country’s currency vis-à-vis the 
host country’s currency and thus an expected increase (decrease) in host country imports 
(exports). A measure of trade openness ( ) is the sum of imports and exports divided 
by GDP (Head and Ries, 1998). The population of country j ( ) serves to proxy for 
market size. To control for each home country’s relative lack of outside trading opportunities, 
we follow Wagner, Head and Ries (2002) and measure economic remoteness as
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, where  is gross global product and k identifies 
potential trading partners for country j other than the host country i.7 All monetary values, 
trade flows and otherwise, have been normalized to 1995 US dollars using GDP deflators. 
Unless noted, data for explanatory variables are from the World Bank (2006). 
Several dummy variables are also included in our estimation equation. Controlling for the 
expected increased trade attributable with corresponding reductions in transportation costs, 
is equal to one if the host and home countries are adjacent. As common language 
has been identified as an important determinant of trade flows in gravity specifications 
(Dunlevy, 2006; Hutchinson, 2002),  is equal to one if the predominant 
language used in the host country is also commonly used in country j (CIA, 2006). Capturing 
the effects of trade agreements,  is equal to one if country j is party to an agreement 
with country i during year t. controls for imports of petroleum and related products 
and is equal to one if country j was an OPEC member for six or more months in year t. 
Capturing related geographic effects on trade, is equal to one if country j is not 
landlocked. Finally, a vector of time dummies, , absorbs macroeconomic fluctuations and 
time-variant trade policy decisions. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample 
and each host country. 
Comparing descriptive statistics for host countries to mean values of the full sample 
provides interesting insights on the diversity of host countries examined. Considering each 
host country’s aggregate imports from and exports to immigrants’ home countries reveals 
Canada and Italy as typical host countries with average values near those found for the full 
sample, while corresponding values for the US and Germany are significantly higher and 
values for Australia, Denmark and Norway significantly lower. With regard to cultural 
differences, Norway’s cultural distance from the immigrants’ home countries considered is 
typical, Italy is the most culturally-similar to the home countries in our data and Sweden is 
the most culturally-dissimilar. In terms of the size of the immigrant population, Australia, 
Canada and Germany can be considered as typical host countries with number of immigrants 
close to the average found for all countries in our data, while the immigrant populations in the 
US and Norway lay on opposite ends, with that of the US being the largest and that of 
Norway being the lowest. Given such heterogeneity in our host nations, we believe that 
estimation of the proportional effects of immigrants and cultural differences on trade provides 
a more accurate portrait of the immigrant-trade links to date. 
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 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable All Hosts Australia Canada Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden US 
Aggregate 
Exportsijt 2,846,355 600,654*** 3,064,109 585,827*** 6,651,118*** 2,929,166 2,062,156** 655,787*** 1,060,742*** 8,067,804*** 
 (11,516,076) (1,606,299) (21,953,655) (1,368,579) (11,630,257) (6,181,892) (5,722,386) (1,568,748) (1,919,262) (20,963,739) 
Manufactured 
Exportsijt 2, 373,484 314,973*** 2,247 306 407,154*** 6,163,385*** 2,670,057 1,427,504*** 221,429*** 941,041*** 7,019,242*** 
 (9,685,055) (770,635) (16,866,301) (959,798) (10,768,369) (5,574,322) (3,623,542) (482,451) (1,670,911) (18,627,374) 
Non-
Manufactured 
Exportsijt 
472,863 
(2,181,436) 
285,681*** 
(939,424) 
816,843 
(5,142,456) 
178,673*** 
(426,613) 
487,733 
(1,017,709) 
259,109*** 
(619,761) 
634,652 
(2,160,012) 
434,358 
(1,169,514) 
117,701*** 
(268,817) 
1,048,455*** 
(2,685,990) 
 
Aggregate 
Importsijt 3,043,045 707,249*** 2,667,156 577,183*** 5,760,861*** 2,679,597 1,925,247*** 449,139*** 867,773*** 11,818,257*** 
 (12,303,484) (1,864,083) (15,264,857) (1,363,921) (9,615,832) (5,814,895) (4,369,482) (944,642) (1,900,474) (29,514,658) 
Manufactured 
Importsijt 2,553,470 639,539*** 2,350,911 464,913*** 4,773,483*** 2,140,572 1,490,492*** 376,801*** 721,960*** 10,077,052*** 
 (10,743,097) (1,782,487) (13,816,945) (1,156,805) (8,328,884) (4,956,609) (3,609,111) (824,098) (1,657,528) (25,659,622) 
Non-
Manufactured 
Importsijt 
489,580 
(2,077,562) 
67,709*** 
(172,680) 
316,021** 
(1,485,276) 
112,269*** 
(247,036) 
987,378*** 
(1,912,395) 
539,025 
(981,210) 
434,755 
(880,029) 
72,337*** 
(154,674) 
145,813*** 
(348,530) 
1,741,481*** 
(5,358,722) 
 
Cultural 
Distanceij 1.4645 1.3162*** 1.3461*** 1.7492*** 1.3504*** 0.9979*** 1.551** 1.5030 2.0617*** 1.3055*** 
 (0.7022) (0.5877) (0.5561) (0.7535) (0.6208) (0.4646) (0.7256) (0.72) (0.7686) (0.4983) 
Immigrantsijt 60,715 48,521 59,749 2,693*** 83,170 12,520*** 13,370*** 1,510*** 10,445*** 314,454*** 
 (328,645.9) (137,592.2) (105,116.8) (4,968.08) (260,396.5) (22,072.93) (34,134.62) (3,926.5) (27,574.15) (891,510.1) 
Geodesic 
Distanceij 
(kilometers) 
7,073,57 
(4,921.81) 
13,744.87*** 
(3,470.61) 
7,917.84*** 
(3,148.05) 
4,960.51*** 
(4,524.67) 
4,869.25*** 
(4,590.94) 
8,735.95*** 
(3,766.16) 
4,970.56*** 
(4,557.85) 
5,142.00*** 
(4,389.39) 
5,093.30*** 
(4,419.64) 
8,227.89*** 
(3,216.87) 
 
  
 Variable All Hosts Australia Canada Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden US 
GDPjt  362,039.96 377,963.00 374,928.02 381,824.09 359,116.23 369,814.26 379,151.12 381,709.84 380,836.13 260,035.15*** 
 (1,096,381) (1,146,323) (1,147,248) (1,147,220) (1,136,473) (1,145,425) (1,147,571) (1,147,244) (1,147,400) (592,571) 
Populationjt 71,387.40 71,935.06 71,926.72 72,296.23 71,164.06 71,525.55 72,142.10 72,308.97 72,243.90 68,284.84 
 (190,910.49) (191,279.93) (191,529.13) (191,424.16) (191,590.22) (191,587.39) (191,473.94) (191,419.66) (191,442.02) (189,924.10) 
Opennessjt 0.7422 0.7457 0.7402 0.7413 0.7433 0.7445 0.7342 0.741 0.7405 0.7487 
 (0.409) (0.4091) (0.4107) (0.4107) (0.4103) (0.4099) (0.4066) (0.4108) (0.4107) (0.4061) 
Remotenessjt 25,705.47 25,671.99 25,708.94 25,691.11 25,728.81 25,719.44 25,715.61 25,681.55 25,701.65 25,730.15 
 (45,322.26) (45,389.6) (45,370.9) (45,380.18) (45,359.99) (45,365.2) (45,367.3) (45,384.97) (45,374.75) (45,359.23) 
∆ ln 
Exchange 
Rateijt 
 
0.0556 
(0.2039) 
0.0460 
(0.2136) 
0.0865*** 
(0.1993) 
0.0400 
(0.2014) 
0.0356* 
(0.2012) 
0.0590 
(0.2048) 
0.0347** 
(0.2012) 
0.0477 
(0.1988) 
0.0443 
(0.2071) 
0.1069*** 
(0.1969) 
Common 
Languageij 
0.2255 
(0.418) 
0.4179*** 
(0.4938) 
0.3881*** 
(0.4879) 
0.4925*** 
(0.5006) 
0.1493*** 
(0.3568) 
0.1642*** 
(0.3709) 
0.0299*** 
(0.1704) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.3881*** 
(0.4879) 
Adjacencyij 0.0381 0.00*** 0.0149*** 0.0149*** 0.1194*** 0.0597* 0.0299 0.0448 0.0299 0.0299 
 (0.1916) (0.00) (0.1214) (0.1214) (0.3247) (0.2372) (0.1704) (0.2071) (0.1704) (0.1704) 
OPECj 0.0597 0.0597 0.0597 0.0597 0.0597 0.0597 0.0597 0.0597 0.0597 0.0597 
 (0.237) (0.2372) (0.2372) (0.2372) (0.2372) (0.2372) (0.2372) (0.2372) (0.2372) (0.2372) 
Seaportj 0.8209 0.8209 0.8209 0.8209 0.8209 0.8209 0.8209 0.8209 0.8209 0.8209 
 (0.3835) (0.3839) (0.3839) (0.3839) (0.3839) (0.3839) (0.3839) (0.3839) (0.3839) (0.3839) 
Sample sizes for individual host countries equal 402 observations. The "all hosts" sample is equal to 3,618 observations. Population and trade values in 1,000s.  
GDP values in 100,000s. All monetary values are in 1995 US dollars. "***", "**" and "*" denote statistical significance from the "all hosts" mean at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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To calculate our measure of cultural distance, we follow Tadesse and White (2007, 
2008a, 2008b) and White and Tadesse (2008a) and use data from the WVS and the EVS 
(Inglehart et al., 2004; Hagenaars et al., 2003). The surveys provide data from representative 
national samples that pertain to a broad and varying set of topics that include economics, 
politics, family values, religion, sexual behavior, gender roles, communal identities, civic 
engagement, ethical concerns, environmental protection, and scientific/technological progress 
(Inglehart et al., 2004). Factor analysis is used to classify respondents along two dimensions 
of culture: Traditional authority vs. Secular-Rational authority and Survival values vs. 
Self-Expression values (Inglehart et al., 2004).8 We derive average and
values for each nation and then derive the cultural distance between each host-home country 
pair as .9 Table 2 presents the corresponding 
cultural distances between all host-home country pairs in our data, while Figure 1 illustrates 
differences across  and  dimensions and cultural distances between several host-
home country pairs. 
The dimension of culture reflects a contrast between societies in which deference to 
the authority of a God, a nation or the family is viewed as important or as an expectation (i.e., 
Traditional authority) and those societies in which the individual and self-expression are 
stressed (i.e., Secular-rational authority). Members of such societies view large families and 
large numbers of children as positive achievements. Divorce, abortion, euthanasia and 
suicide, are viewed in a negative light. The emphasis placed on national pride and respect for 
authority in traditional societies is characterized by obedience to traditional/religious 
authority, adherence to family/communal obligations, and norms of sharing. That said, 
individuals in traditional societies rarely discuss politics and are seemingly passive in their 
acceptance of national authority. This may follow from a pervasive social emphasis on 
conformity. Emblematic of this is an adoption of absolute standards regarding what is good 
and what is evil. Members of secular-rational societies, on the other hand, tend to hold 
opposing views on these topics. 
The dimension of culture reflects differences between societies that emphasize hard 
work and self-denial (i.e., Survival values) and those that place greater emphasis on quality of 
life issues, such as women’s emancipation and equal status for racial and sexual minorities 
(i.e., Self-expression values). Societies in which individuals focus more on survival tend to 
emphasize economic and physical security more than autonomy. The uncertainty surrounding 
economic and physical well-being manifests more generally as members of such societies 
find foreigners and outsiders, ethnic diversity and cultural change to be threatening. Societies 
in which self-expression values are emphasized tend to hold opposing preferences from 
individuals in societies that emphasize survival. 
 
                                                      
8
 Although the WVS/EVS provides data for 81 countries, incomplete data restricts our analysis to 68 nations. 
9
 On average, the Values Surveys provide TSR and SSE values for 1,190 residents of each nation in our sample. 
Mean values are un-weighted arithmetic averages. 
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Figure 1. Cultural Distances, Select Host-Home Country Pairs. 
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Table 2. Host-Home Country Cultural Distances 
 
Host: Australia Canada Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden US 
Albania 1.58 1.61 2.02 1.24 0.94 1.82 1.73 2.33 1.54 
Algeria 1.89 1.83 2.63 2.09 1.45 2.38 2.34 2.97 1.64 
Argentina 1.09 1.04 1.88 1.54 0.75 1.62 1.61 2.22 0.85 
Armenia 1.77 1.83 2.06 1.16 1.12 1.90 1.78 2.35 1.79 
Australia 0.00 0.16 0.93 1.21 0.65 0.67 0.74 1.25 0.39 
Austria 0.34 0.48 0.81 0.88 0.42 0.56 0.55 1.16 0.63 
Azerbaijan 1.87 1.89 2.35 1.56 1.26 2.15 2.07 2.67 1.79 
Bangladesh 1.80 1.76 2.51 1.95 1.34 2.27 2.23 2.85 1.58 
Belgium 0.63 0.77 0.87 0.60 0.33 0.66 0.58 1.21 0.88 
Brazil 1.42 1.36 2.20 1.78 1.05 1.95 1.92 2.54 1.16 
Bulgaria 1.93 2.01 2.04 1.06 1.30 1.92 1.79 2.29 2.01 
Canada 0.16 0.00 1.08 1.36 0.72 0.82 0.90 1.39 0.25 
Chile 1.21 1.16 1.98 1.59 0.83 1.73 1.70 2.32 0.97 
China 2.07 2.18 1.96 0.97 1.50 1.90 1.75 2.15 2.23 
Colombia 1.85 1.73 2.76 2.58 1.76 2.50 2.53 3.10 1.48 
Croatia 1.00 1.05 1.48 0.90 0.36 1.27 1.19 1.81 1.01 
Czech Rep. 1.27 1.42 1.04 0.06 0.89 0.99 0.83 1.27 1.54 
Denmark 0.93 1.08 0.00 1.00 1.18 0.26 0.29 0.34 1.32 
Dominican Rep. 1.23 1.16 2.03 1.67 0.90 1.77 1.76 2.37 0.96 
Egypt 1.64 1.57 2.44 2.01 1.28 2.18 2.16 2.78 1.36 
El Salvador 2.33 2.18 3.25 3.17 2.33 2.99 3.04 3.57 1.94 
Estonia 1.84 1.94 1.90 0.92 1.23 1.80 1.66 2.15 1.96 
Finland 0.60 0.75 0.68 0.62 0.51 0.47 0.39 1.01 0.91 
France 0.71 0.82 1.02 0.62 0.23 0.81 0.73 1.35 0.89 
Germany 1.21 1.36 1.00 0.00 0.84 0.93 0.78 1.23 1.48 
Greece 0.80 0.90 1.11 0.61 0.24 0.91 0.83 1.44 0.95 
Hungary 1.69 1.75 1.98 1.10 1.04 1.82 1.71 2.28 1.71 
Iceland 0.30 0.47 0.65 0.98 0.65 0.38 0.44 0.99 0.69 
India 1.09 1.08 1.73 1.24 0.55 1.49 1.44 2.07 0.97 
Indonesia 1.59 1.56 2.28 1.72 1.10 2.04 1.99 2.62 1.39 
Ireland 0.75 0.64 1.65 1.60 0.77 1.39 1.42 1.99 0.40 
Israel 0.79 0.87 1.20 0.72 0.16 0.99 0.91 1.53 0.90 
Italy 0.65 0.72 1.18 0.84 0.00 0.94 0.89 1.52 0.73 
Japan 1.35 1.51 0.89 0.31 1.10 0.91 0.76 1.05 1.67 
Jordan 2.00 1.94 2.74 2.20 1.57 2.50 2.46 3.09 1.74 
Korea (Rep.) 1.55 1.63 1.75 0.84 0.91 1.60 1.48 2.03 1.62 
Latvia 1.85 1.92 2.06 1.13 1.20 1.92 1.80 2.34 1.90 
Luxembourg 0.64 0.79 0.73 0.57 0.47 0.53 0.44 1.06 0.93 
Macedonia 2.20 2.25 2.50 1.58 1.55 2.34 2.23 2.78 2.18 
Mexico 1.08 0.98 1.97 1.80 0.96 1.70 1.72 2.31 0.75 
Morocco 2.85 2.78 3.62 3.05 2.45 3.37 3.34 3.96 2.56 
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Table 2. Continued 
Host: Australia Canada Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden US 
Netherlands 0.67 0.82 0.26 0.93 0.94 0.00 0.16 0.60 1.06 
New 
Zealand 0.32 0.48 0.62 0.98 0.67 0.36 0.42 0.96 0.71 
Nigeria 1.66 1.56 2.52 2.21 1.43 2.26 2.26 2.87 1.33 
Norway 0.74 0.90 0.29 0.78 0.89 0.16 0.00 0.63 1.12 
Pakistan 1.94 1.89 2.66 2.10 1.48 2.42 2.38 3.00 1.70 
Peru 1.44 1.38 2.20 1.76 1.04 1.95 1.92 2.54 1.19 
Philippines 1.39 1.35 2.13 1.66 0.96 1.88 1.85 2.47 1.16 
Poland 1.40 1.39 2.03 1.44 0.86 1.80 1.74 2.37 1.26 
Portugal 1.21 1.20 1.87 1.35 0.69 1.63 1.58 2.21 1.06 
Romania 2.04 2.07 2.47 1.63 1.41 2.29 2.19 2.78 1.97 
Russian Fed. 2.17 2.25 2.31 1.33 1.53 2.19 2.06 2.56 2.23 
Slovak Rep. 1.26 1.36 1.45 0.60 0.65 1.30 1.18 1.75 1.38 
Slovenia 1.14 1.27 1.14 0.27 0.65 1.02 0.88 1.41 1.35 
South Africa 1.33 1.28 2.09 1.66 0.93 1.84 1.81 2.43 1.09 
Spain 0.81 0.89 1.24 0.75 0.17 1.03 0.95 1.58 0.90 
Sweden 1.25 1.39 0.34 1.23 1.52 0.60 0.63 0.00 1.64 
Switzerland 0.60 0.75 0.63 0.64 0.56 0.42 0.34 0.96 0.93 
Tanzania 1.70 1.61 2.55 2.21 1.44 2.29 2.29 2.89 1.38 
Turkey 1.73 1.72 2.34 1.68 1.18 2.12 2.05 2.67 1.57 
Uganda 1.67 1.62 2.41 1.89 1.24 2.16 2.13 2.75 1.43 
Ukraine 2.08 2.15 2.26 1.30 1.44 2.13 2.00 2.53 2.13 
UK 0.20 0.35 0.73 1.13 0.72 0.47 0.56 1.05 0.59 
USA 0.39 0.25 1.32 1.48 0.73 1.06 1.12 1.64 0.00 
Uruguay 0.86 0.90 1.42 0.95 0.25 1.19 1.13 1.76 0.85 
Venezuela 1.25 1.14 2.14 1.96 1.13 1.88 1.90 2.48 0.90 
Vietnam 1.31 1.27 2.05 1.60 0.88 1.80 1.77 2.39 1.09 
Zimbabwe 2.06 2.02 2.76 2.15 1.58 2.52 2.47 3.10 1.84 
 
The characteristics represented by the TSR and SSE dimensions correspond with the 
channels through which immigrants influence trade. The emphasis on family and religion and 
associated adherence to family/communal obligations and norms of sharing suggests that, in 
the absence of formal contracting or access to a well-functioning judiciary or 
acceptance/adherence to the rule of law, the importance of business and social networks 
would be magnified. Repeated interaction with members of business and social networks 
would build trust since subsequent interaction is viewed as representative of commitment and 
reciprocity of trust and respect would be expected. It is reasonable to expect less trade will 
take place when functioning trade channels and formal contracting are weak or non-existent. 
In such instances, immigrants have a positive role to play as trade-intermediaries. 
Uncertainty relating to survival-orientation may increase the value of immigrants’ 
connections in terms of decreasing transactions costs and prove more effective with respect to 
increasing trade flows. Similarly, that foreigners and outsiders are viewed as threats is another 
example of the basis for which immigrants’ network connections may be useful in increasing 
trade flows. The transplanted home bias effect can result from product differentiation, 
variation in output mix or relative efficiencies in production across host-home country 
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pairings. As mentioned, immigrants would essentially fill voids – aiding in the matching of 
potential buyers and sellers, conveying information about profitable trading opportunities or 
about potential parties to transactions, or otherwise – and, in doing so, facilitating 
transactions. 
 
 
3. ESTIMATION RESULTS/DISCUSSION 
 
Following Ranjan and Tobias (2005), Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Head and Ries 
(1998), we estimate equation (3) using the Tobit technique.10 Since we have the parameter 
, the resulting coefficients are not true elasticities. However, as the values of , relative to 
the mean values of corresponding dependent variable measures, are quite small, we can 
heuristically interpret the coefficients as elasticities. Table 3 presents results obtained when 
aggregate exports and imports, as well as manufactured and non-manufactured goods exports 
and imports, are employed as dependent variables.11 Focusing first on the immigrant stock 
variables, we find positive and significant coefficients across all estimations. Considered in 
conjunction with the coefficient on the variable that interacts the immigrant stock, cultural 
distance and host country dummy variables, we find strong evidence of pro-trade immigrant 
effects; however, the magnitudes of the effects vary considerably across host countries. For 
example, the proportional immigrant effect on aggregate imports is largest for the US 
(0.2968), Canada (0.2727) and Australia (0.2714) and is smallest for Denmark (0.124) and 
Norway (0.1242). A similar pattern emerges when aggregate exports are considered: 
Australia (0.3544), Germany (0.2534) and Italy (0.2443) are estimated to have the largest 
proportional effects, while Denmark (0.1195) has the smallest; the immigrant-export effect 
for Norway is not significantly different from zero. 
With respect to the cultural distance variables, we find negative coefficients in all 
estimations, although significance is lacking with respect to aggregate exports and exports of 
manufactured goods. From Table 1, we see that host countries which are relatively more 
culturally-distant from the home countries included in this data (i.e., Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) also tend to host fewer immigrants relative to host 
countries that are, on average, less culturally-distant (i.e., Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy 
and the US). In fact, Denmark and Norway have by far the fewest immigrants among the host 
countries included in this data set and, with the exception of Sweden, are more culturally-
distant from the home countries in the data than all other host countries. Thus, the observed 
variation in immigrant-trade links across aggregate export and import measures may reflect 
the relative inability of immigrants who reside in more culturally-distant host countries to 
overcome the trade-inhibiting effects of the relatively larger cultural differences between their 
home and host countries. 
The remaining coefficients in Table 3 conform to expectations. Coefficients on the 
variables indicating changes in host-home country exchange rates are positive and negative 
with respect to imports and exports, respectively, and are generally significant,. Greater host-
home country geodesic distance, implying higher transport costs, corresponds with reduced 
                                                      
10
 We also provide similar estimates derived by employing random effects GLS approach as a robustness check. 
11
 The full set of estimation results is available upon request. 
η
η
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trade levels. Also, as expected, higher home country GDP corresponds to both greater host 
country exports and imports. Likewise, home countries that are relatively more open to trade 
tend to trade more with the host countries in our sample. Coefficients on the home country 
population variables are positive and significant in all estimations but one. Intuitively, this 
means that larger populations imply larger markets for host country exports to serve and, 
perhaps, a greater ability of the home countries to export to the host countries. Home country 
economic remoteness is found, in many instances, to negatively affect trade with the host 
country. Estimated coefficients on the dummy variables suggest that adjacency, commonality 
of language, free trade agreements and having coastal access all facilitate trade and that, with 
the exception of trade in non-manufactured goods, the nine host countries tend to trade 
relatively less with home countries that are members of OPEC. 
To further examine variation in immigrant-trade links across host countries, we estimate 
equation (2) while employing disaggregated measures of trade – imports and exports of 
manufactured and non-manufactured products and 1-digit SITC sector values of imports and 
exports – as dependent variables. The resulting proportional immigrant effects on host 
country imports and exports are presented in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. For most host 
countries and measures of trade, estimated proportional immigrant effects are positive and 
significant; however, variation is again noted across host economies. Column (a) of Table 3 
reports average immigrant effects and corresponding standard deviations. Immigrant effects 
that are greater in magnitude than the corresponding average effect are noted by bold 
typeface. 
Comparing magnitudes of immigrants’ effects on aggregate, manufactured and non-
manufactured goods imports, separately, across the host countries (the first three trade 
measures presented in Table 4), we see above-average immigrant effects for Australia, 
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the US. Yet, only effects reported for the US 
(aggregate imports (0.2968) and manufactured goods imports (0.3688)) and Canada 
(manufactured goods imports (0.3302)) are more than one standard deviation above the 
associated mean effects. The corresponding effects (aggregate, manufactured and non-
manufactured goods imports) for Denmark and Norway fall below the relevant mean values, 
as do estimated effects for aggregate and manufactured goods imports for Italy and Sweden. 
In fact, the estimated effects for Norway, while positive and significant, are more than one 
standard deviation below the mean effect. Similarly, for Denmark, the estimated effect of 
immigrants on aggregate imports and imports of non-manufactured products lies below the 
mean effect by are more than one standard deviation. 
A similar pattern also emerges when we compare the estimated proportional effects of 
immigrants on host country exports. Results presented for the first three trade measures in 
Table 5 show that proportional immigrant effects for Australia, Germany and the US are 
greater in magnitude as compared to the mean effect. Likewise, for Italy and Sweden, the 
corresponding effect of immigrants on aggregate and manufactured goods exports is greater 
than the mean effect. Unlike the results presented in Table 4 for imports, here only the effects 
estimated for Australia (0.3544, 0.3287 and 0.4046 for aggregate, manufactured and non-
manufactured goods exports, respectively) and the US (0.3676 for non-manufactured goods 
exports) are greater than one standard deviation above the relevant mean. 
 Table 3. Aggregate, Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing Imports and Exports - Tobit Coefficients 
 
Dep. Variable: ln Importsijt 
ln Manuf. 
Importsijt 
ln Non-Manuf. 
Importsijt ln Exportsijt 
ln Manuf. 
Exportsijt 
ln Non-Manuf. 
Exportsijt 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
ln Immigrantsijt 0.2107*** 0.222*** 0.2758*** 0.2443*** 0.2673*** 0.1454*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0275) (0.0306) (0.0221) (0.0219) (0.0257) 
ln Immigrantsijt x ln Cultural Distanceij  0.0607 0.0498 0.1066** 0.1101*** 0.0614* 0.2592*** 
     x Host Country: Australia (0.0376) (0.0401) (0.0446) (0.0322) (0.0319) (0.0375) 
ln Immigrantsijt x ln Cultural Distanceij  0.062* 0.1082*** 0.0015 -0.0543* -0.1129*** 0.1742*** 
     x Host Country: Canada (0.0371) (0.0396) (0.0439) (0.0317) (0.0315) (0.037) 
ln Immigrantsijt x ln Cultural Distanceij  -0.0867** -0.0232 -0.1183** -0.1248*** -0.1259*** 0.0166 
     x Host Country: Denmark (0.0409) (0.0436) (0.0484) (0.0349) (0.0346) (0.0408) 
ln Immigrantsijt x ln Cultural Distanceij  0.0375 0.0495 0.0735* 0.0091 0.0007 0.1276*** 
     x Host Country: Germany (0.0375) (0.04) (0.0444) (0.032) (0.0318) (0.0374) 
ln Immigrantsijt x ln Cultural Distanceij  0.0231 0.071* -0.013 -0.0892*** -0.1052*** 0.0572* 
     x Host Country: The Netherlands (0.0349) (0.0372) (0.0413) (0.0298) (0.0296) (0.0348) 
ln Immigrantsijt x ln Cultural Distanceij  -0.0865** -0.0941** -0.1499*** -0.2444*** -0.2596*** -0.0661* 
     x Host Country: Norway (0.0364) (0.0388) (0.0431) (0.0311) (0.0309) (0.0363) 
ln Immigrantsijt x ln Cultural Distanceij  -0.0167 -0.0307 -0.0099 -0.0435 -0.0543 0.0655* 
     x Host Country: Sweden (0.0393) (0.0419) (0.0466) (0.0336) (0.0333) (0.0392) 
ln Immigrantsijt x ln Cultural Distanceij  0.0861** 0.1468*** -0.0154 -0.0362 -0.0728** 0.2222*** 
     x Host Country: United States (0.0352) (0.0376) (0.0417) (0.0301) (0.0299) (0.0352) 
ln Cultural Distanceij -0.7758*** -1.2148*** -0.6172** -0.1655 -0.1035 -1.235*** 
 (0.2313) (0.2467) (0.2739) (0.1978) (0.196) (0.2308) 
∆ ln Exchange Rateijt 0.4108*** 0.5933*** 0.4469*** -0.342*** -0.1892 -0.6029*** 
 (0.1434) (0.153) (0.1697) (0.1227) (0.1216) (0.1432) 
ln Geodesic Distanceij -0.3989*** -0.5593*** -0.0796 -0.4641*** -0.4411*** -0.6899*** 
 (0.042) (0.0448) (0.0497) (0.0359) (0.0356) (0.0419) 
 ln GDPjt 0.8615*** 0.9671*** 0.8558*** 0.6104*** 0.5983*** 0.6428*** 
 (0.0562) (0.06) (0.0665) (0.0481) (0.0476) (0.0561) 
ln Trade Opennessjt 0.3635*** 0.9783*** -0.0275 0.047 0.0584 0.1078 
 (0.0727) (0.0776) (0.0861) (0.0622) (0.0616) (0.0726) 
ln Populationjt 0.0631* 0.119*** -0.0801** 0.0546* 0.0484* 0.029 
 (0.034) (0.0363) (0.0403) (0.0291) (0.0288) (0.034) 
ln Economic Remotenessjt -0.078 -0.1452*** 0.1274** -0.1688*** -0.2011*** -0.1421*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0525) (0.0582) (0.0421) (0.0417) (0.0491) 
Shared Borderij 0.7473*** 0.4321** 1.2788*** 0.8551*** 0.7551*** 0.9957*** 
 (0.1621) (0.1729) (0.1918) (0.1386) (0.1373) (0.1617) 
Common Languageij 0.2724*** 0.195** 0.3915*** 0.3032*** 0.4306*** 0.2664*** 
 (0.0783) (0.0835) (0.0927) (0.0669) (0.0663) (0.0781) 
FTAijt 0.2273** 0.2436** 0.4192*** 0.2241*** 0.1524** 0.4639*** 
 (0.09) (0.096) (0.1065) (0.077) (0.0763) (0.0898) 
OPECj -0.2795** -2.2475*** 0.9305*** -0.1036 -0.2759*** 0.3211** 
 (0.1267) (0.1352) (0.15) (0.1084) (0.1074) (0.1264) 
Seaportj 0.9291*** 1.0264*** 1.2957*** 0.7254*** 0.6387*** 0.9805*** 
 (0.0813) (0.0867) (0.0964) (0.0695) (0.0689) (0.0811) 
Constant -7.1652*** -8.765*** -11.9943*** 0.3432 0.6089 0.2197 
 (1.7233) (1.8382) (2.0398) (1.474) (1.4605) (1.7191) 
N 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 3,618 
Pseudo-R2 0.25 0.26 0.19 0.27 0.28 0.22 
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.68 0.67 0.74 0.73 0.65 
Log-likelihood -6 984 -7 207 -7 551 -6 433 -6 399 -6 973 
LR Statistic 4.606*** 5.008*** 3.506*** 4.758*** 5.098*** 4.005*** 
Coefficients on dummy variables representing years and host countries not reported. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: "***", "**", and "*" indicate 
significance from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 Table 4. Proportional Immigrant Effects, Imports 
 
 Average Australia Canada Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden US 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
Aggregate Imports 0.2195 0.2714*** 0.2727*** 0.124*** 0.2482*** 0.2107*** 0.2338*** 0.1242*** 0.194*** 0.2968*** 
 (0.0627) (7.29) (7.4) (3.29) (6.84) (8.17) (7.61) (4.8) (5.2) (8.38) 
Manufactured Products 0.2528 0.2718*** 0.3302*** 0.1988*** 0.2715*** 0.222*** 0.293*** 0.1279*** 0.1913*** 0.3688*** 
 (0.075) (6.84) (8.4) (4.94) (7.01) (8.07) (8.94) (4.63) (4.81) (9.76) 
Non-Manufactured Products 0.2619 0.3824*** 0.2773*** 0.1575*** 0.3493*** 0.2758*** 0.2628*** 0.1259*** 0.2659*** 0.2604*** 
 (0.0806) (8.65) (6.36) (3.52) (8.13) (9.01) (7.22) (4.11) (6.01) (6.21) 
SITC-0: Food and Live Animals 0.3557 0.4955*** 0.4213*** 0.2909*** 0.4666*** 0.3661*** 0.4033*** 0.128*** 0.3186*** 0.3108*** 
 (0.1107) (10.37) (8.96) (6.03) (10.08) (11.09) (10.27) (3.88) (6.68) (6.87) 
SITC-1: Beverages and Tobacco 0.2439 0.339*** 0.3934*** 0.0489 0.3881*** 0.4678*** 0.3533*** -0.138*** 0.125** 0.2669*** 
 (0.2204) (5.3) (6.3) (0.75) (6.33) (10.37) (6.75) (3.04) (1.96) (4.45) 
SITC-2: Crude Materials, Inedible,  
Except Fuels 0.2512 0.3723*** 0.3106*** 0.1918*** 0.3088*** 0.2485*** 0.2877*** 0.0514 0.2581*** 0.2831*** 
 (0.1064) (6.94) (5.93) (3.57) (6.0) (6.77) (6.59) (1.4) (4.84) (5.63) 
SITC-3: Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and 
Related Materials 0.2321 0.3217*** 0.3131*** -0.1546 0.434*** 0.2938*** 0.2685*** 0.0397 0.1178 0.4582*** 
 (0.1848) (2.71) (2.88) (1.3) (4.17) (3.77) (2.97) (0.48) (1.04) (4.48) 
SITC-4: Animal and Vegetable Oils,  
Fats and Waxes 0.5249 0.653*** 0.7506*** 0.4037*** 0.6875*** 0.4097*** 0.5931*** 0.2747*** 0.4101*** 0.542*** 
 (0.1591) (7.57) (9.41) (4.47) (9.07) (7.00) (9.06) (4.64) (4.78) (7.21) 
SITC-5: Chemicals and Related Products, 
n.e.s. 0.2017 0.3083*** 0.3147*** 0.0546 0.2712*** 0.2002*** 0.3065*** 0.0346 0.0916* 0.3228*** 
 (0.1361) (6.29) (6.55) (1.1) (5.75) (5.89) (7.65) (1.02) (1.86) (7.0) 
SITC-6: Manufactured Goods Classified 
by Material 0.2229 0.3027*** 0.3044*** 0.1564*** 0.2195*** 0.1435*** 0.2709*** 0.1194*** 0.196*** 0.2935*** 
 (0.0729) (6.64) (6.76) (3.38) (4.95) (4.56) (7.2) (3.77) (4.29) (6.77) 
SITC-7: Machinery and Transport 
Equipment 0.2538 0.2467*** 0.3773*** 0.1592*** 0.2584*** 0.2501*** 0.3267*** 0.0944*** 0.2589*** 0.3125*** 
 (0.0855) (5.49) (8.5) (3.49) (5.91) (8.04) (8.82) (3.02) (5.76) (7.32) 
           
  Average Australia Canada Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden US 
SITC-8: Miscellaneous Manufactured 
Articles 0.3415 0.2664*** 0.4272*** 0.348*** 0.4217*** 0.2915*** 0.4131*** 0.1341*** 0.2879*** 0.4832*** 
 (0.1078) (5.99) (9.74) (7.74) (9.76) (9.50) (11.29) (4.35) (6.48) (11.45) 
SITC-9: Commodities and Transactions, 
n.e.c. 0.1148 0.0593 0.2581*** 0.1838*** 0.0201 0.2469*** 0.1846*** 0.2017*** 0.2858*** 0.2441*** 
 (0.1798) (0.98) (4.48) (3.12) (0.35) (5.95) (3.81) (4.93) (4.72) (4.41) 
Statistical significance is denoted as follows: "**". "*". and "#" indicate significance from zero at the 1%. 5%. and 10% levels. respectively. Bold 
(italicized) font indicates corresponding effect is greater (less) than the average effect listed in leftmost column. Values presented in parentheses below 
average effects are standard deviations. Values presented below proportional immigrant effects are z-statistics. Z-statistics are constructed as 
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 Table 5. Proportional Immigrant Effects. Exports 
 
 Average Australia Canada Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden US 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
Aggregate Exports 0.1917 0.3544*** 0.19*** 0.1195*** 0.2534*** 0.2443*** 0.1551*** -0.0001 0.2008*** 0.2081*** 
 (0.0979) (11.12) (6.03) (3.7) (8.16) (11.05) (5.9) (0.0) (6.3) (6.86) 
Manufactured Products 0.1922 0.3287*** 0.1544*** 0.1414*** 0.268*** 0.2673*** 0.1621*** 0.0077 0.213*** 0.1945*** 
 (0.0951) (10.41) (4.94) (4.42) (8.71) (12.21) (6.22) (0.35) (6.74) (6.48) 
Non-Manufactured Products 0.2406 0.4046*** 0.3196*** 0.162*** 0.273*** 0.1454*** 0.2026*** 0.0793*** 0.2109*** 0.3676*** 
 (0.1083) (10.88) (8.69) (4.3) (7.55) (5.66) (6.6) (3.07) (5.67) (10.4) 
SITC-0: Food and Live Animals 0.2102 0.383*** 0.3037*** 0.1204*** 0.2253*** 0.1322*** 0.1732*** 0.0634** 0.1371*** 0.3535*** 
 (0.1128) (9.13) (7.33) (2.84) (5.53) (4.56) (5.01) (2.18) (3.26) (8.87) 
SITC-1: Beverages and Tobacco 0.2440 0.0673 0.4375*** 0.1048** 0.3267*** 0.3782*** 0.2054*** 0.012 0.2495*** 0.4942*** 
 (0.182) (1.27) (8.48) (2.0) (6.54) (10.51) (4.85) (0.31) (4.81) (10.13) 
SITC-2: Crude Materials. Inedible. 
Except Fuels 0.3185 0.5893*** 0.3735*** 0.2937*** 0.3742*** 0.1737*** 0.2534*** 0.1539*** 0.3101*** 0.3445*** 
 (0.129) (13.56) (8.75) (6.7) (8.9) (5.79) (7.12) (5.1) (7.17) (8.39) 
SITC-3: Mineral Fuels. Lubricants and 
Related Materials 0.4578 0.6726*** 0.6087*** 0.394*** 0.6208*** 0.3594*** 0.4052*** 0.1274*** 0.4111*** 0.5209*** 
 (0.1686) (9.4) (8.88) (5.51) (9.4) (7.44) (7.24) (2.62) (5.96) (8.05) 
SITC-4: Animal and Vegetable Oils.  
Fats and Waxes 0.3637 0.6822*** 0.6532*** 0.2066*** 0.4613*** 0.1731*** 0.3304*** 0.0417 0.2356*** 0.5309*** 
 (0.2328) (10.59) (10.49) (3.35) (8.0) (4.11) (6.76) (0.93) (3.85) (9.37) 
SITC-5: Chemicals and Related Products. 
n.e.s. 0.2241 0.2953*** 0.317*** 0.2079*** 0.3169*** 0.2602*** 0.2254*** 0.0285 0.1762*** 0.2184*** 
 (0.0977) (4.32) (4.66) (3.04) (4.68) (11.12) (3.44) (0.45) (2.58) (3.24) 
SITC-6: Manufactured Goods Classified 
by Material 0.2202 0.2894*** 0.2535*** 0.1198*** 0.3332*** 0.2485*** 0.2081*** 0.044* 0.2488*** 0.2369*** 
 (0.0879) (8.38) (7.44) (3.43) (9.93) (10.40) (7.31) (1.84) (7.21) (7.22) 
SITC-7: Machinery and Transport 
Equipment 0.1844 0.2473*** 0.1337*** 0.1766*** 0.2572*** 0.2654*** 0.153*** 0.0222 0.2469*** 0.1798*** 
 (0.0847) (7.78) (4.26) (5.49) (8.32) (12.06) (5.83) (1.01) (7.77) (5.95) 
           
  Average Australia Canada Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden US 
           
SITC-8: Miscellaneous Manufactured 
Articles 0.2194 0.2997*** 0.2498*** 0.1445*** 0.3216*** 0.2528*** 0.1872*** 0.0376* 0.2228*** 0.2584*** 
 (0.0867) (9.87) (8.33) (4.71) (10.9) (12.04) (7.48) (1.78) (7.34) (8.96) 
SITC-9: Commodities and Transactions. 
n.e.c. 0.1907 0.4247*** 0.1573*** 0.1363*** 0.2099*** 0.3034*** 0.1268*** 0.01 0.1658*** 0.1921*** 
 (0.1188) (10.25) (3.84) (3.25) (5.21) (10.53) (3.71) (0.35) (4.0) (4.88) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Simpson's Diversity Indexes by Host Country and Year 
 
 
Average Australia Canada Denmark Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden US 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
2001 14.03% 30.62% 24.96% 7.04% 13.25% 3.71% 11.32% 4.58% 14.26% 16.54% 
2000 14.05% 31.70% 24.77% 6.91% 13.18% 3.58% 11.16% 4.63% 14.09% 16.44% 
1999 13.63% 31.45% 25.10% 6.79% 13.13% 2.89% 11.07% 4.53% 13.92% 13.81% 
1998 13.75% 31.24% 24.53% 6.62% 13.11% 2.70% 10.94% 4.37% 16.56% 13.64% 
1997 13.53% 31.05% 24.07% 6.45% 12.83% 2.59% 10.84% 4.38% 16.11% 13.45% 
1996 13.37% 31.21% 23.99% 6.23% 12.81% 1.87% 10.83% 4.49% 15.73% 13.20% 
           
Avg. 13.73% 31.21%*** 24.57%*** 6.68%*** 13.05%*** 2.89%*** 11.03%*** 4.5%*** 15.11%*** 14.52% 
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Most striking is that. in the case of Norway. of the three estimated proportional 
immigrant effects. only the effect on non-manufactured goods exports (0.0793) is significant 
and even this effect is less than one standard deviation below the corresponding mean effect. 
To examine immigrant-trade links at a much greater level of detail. we decompose 
aggregate import and export values into 1-digit SITC sector-level values. Based on the 
observed variation in the magnitudes of the effects across host countries when employing 
aggregate. manufactured and non-manufactured goods trade values as dependent variables. 
we expect to find similar variation from disaggregated measures of trade as well. 
Corresponding proportional immigrant effects are reported in Tables 4 and 5. The estimated 
immigrant-trade links are consistent across measures of trade. yet variable across the host 
countries. We consider this as evidence of the robustness of our general results. Australia. 
Canada. Germany and the US are the host countries where. consistently. above-average 
proportional immigrant-trade effects are estimated. Denmark. Norway and Sweden tend to 
have below-average proportional immigrant-trade effects. while effects for Italy and the 
Netherlands are more mixed. 
As changes in socio-cultural values are often gradual. we assume that host-home country 
cultural distance does not vary during our reference period when estimating the proportional 
influences of hypothetical one percent increases in immigrant stocks on host-home country 
trade flows. Assuming. instead. immigrant stocks remain constant and allowing hypothetical 
one percent increases in cultural distances permits the determination of the relative effects of 
cultural distance on trade. Comparing proportional cultural distance effects to the proportional 
immigrant-import effects (presented in Table 4). we find that in 91 cases both effects are 
significant and. in such instances. the cultural distance effect exceeds the immigrant-import 
effect by an average factor of 6.13. In only one case (US imports of SITC-1 products) is the 
cultural distance effect (-0.1726) less than the corresponding immigrant-export effect 
(0.2669). Comparison of proportional cultural distance effects to immigrant-export effects 
(presented in Table 5) reveals that in only one of the 68 instances in which both the cultural 
distance and immigrant-export effects are significant (Australian exports of manufactured 
products) is the immigrant-export effect (0.3287) greater than the cultural distance effect (-
0.0421). Across all 68 cases. the average cultural distance effect-to-immigrant-export effect 
ratio is 5.8. Thus. we conclude the trade-inhibiting influence of cultural distance far exceeds 
the trade-enhancing effects of immigrants. 
The results presented thus far address the first two of our three principal questions. We 
find greater cultural distance between countries does hinder trade. However. immigrants 
offset. at least in part. the trade-inhibiting influences of cultural distance. These pro-trade 
immigrant effects vary across product types and economic sectors and. more importantly. 
across host countries that differ to the extent which their populations are culturally diverse. 
This brings us to our third question: does cultural diversity within the immigrants’ host 
countries affect the abilities of immigrants’ to increase trade? To address this question. we 
calculate annual values. for each host country. of the Simpson’s Index of Diversity. These 
values. along with host country-specific average values. are presented in Table 6. 
Simpson's Indexes of Diversity is calculated as . where nij is the total 
number of individuals born in a particular country. inclusive of immigrants and the native-
born. Ni is the total population of host country i. Simpson’s Index of Diversity ranges in value 
)1(
)1(
1
−
−
−
∑
ii
ijij
NN
nn
Cultural Diversity, Immigraton and Trade 23
from 0 to 1. with higher values indicating greater diversity. The index effectively reflects the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals are from different countries. 
The coefficients summarized in Tables 4 and 5 represent the expected proportional 
responses of imports and exports. respectively. to a small (i.e.. one percent) proportional 
increase in the immigrant stock variable. By comparing average Simpson’s Index values to 
the estimated proportional effects of immigrants on trade that are presented in Table 4 and 5. 
we can determine whether greater cultural diversity in the immigrants’ host country 
corresponds with immigrants’ influences on trade that are of greater or lesser magnitude. 
Beginning with immigrants’ proportional influences on host country imports. the correlation 
coefficient between the average Simpson’s Index values and the estimated immigrant-import 
effects reported in Table 4 is equal to 0.33. The corresponding correlation coefficient between 
the average Simpson’s Index values and the immigrant-export effects (reported in Table 5) is 
equal to 0.49. In both cases. the coefficients are statistically significant. Thus. we can say that 
greater host country cultural diversity is positively related to immigrant-import and 
immigrant-export effects12 
These findings are not entirely surprising when one glimpses the values in Tables 4 and 
5. A consistent pattern emerges regarding the magnitudes for the immigrant-trade effects. The 
values indicate that the populations of Australia. Canada and Sweden are significantly more 
culturally diverse than are the remaining host countries; however. since the US is not 
significantly different from the cohort-average. it is significantly more diverse than Denmark. 
Germany. Italy. the Netherlands or Norway. 
Revisiting Table 4. we see estimated immigrant-import effects for Australia. Canada. 
Sweden and the US exceed the corresponding cohort-averages in 38 of 52 instances (73.1%). 
while estimated immigrant-export effects for the remaining host countries exceed the 
corresponding cohort averages in 31 of 65 instances (47.7%). Performing the same 
accounting for the values in Table 5. we see that the estimated immigrant-export effects for 
the four most culturally-diverse host countries are above-average for 71.1 percent of the 
cases. while the immigrant-export effects in the remaining hosts are above-average in only 
33.8 percent of cases.  
The results suggest that cultural diversity within the immigrants’ host countries fosters 
the creation of trade-between immigrants host and home countries; however. the inference 
that it enhances immigrants’ abilities to affect trade is not entirely straightforward. Sweden. 
for example. is one anomaly. Estimated to have the third most culturally-diverse population 
among the nine hosts considered. the immigrant-trade effects for Sweden are below average 
in 18 of 26 instances.  
For Australia and Canada. estimated effects exceed the corresponding averages in 22 of 
26 cases. while 23 of 26 estimated effects for the US are above-average. Germany. on the 
other hand. is estimated to be relatively less culturally-diverse. yet in 24 of 26 instances the 
corresponding immigrant-trade effect exceeds the cohort average. Results for Denmark and 
Norway. however. are very much in line with the general finding of a positive relationship 
between host country diversity and greater proportional immigrant-trade links. 
 
 
 
                                                      
12
 Both correlation coefficients are significant from zero at the 1% level. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of how immigrants affect host-home country 
trade flows. we have examined the relationship between immigrants. cultural distance and 
trade for a group of culturally and economically heterogeneous host countries. Our analysis 
extends the related literature. informs the public and political discussions of immigration and. 
potentially. provides information beneficial in the formulation of public policy. Our results 
indicate that immigrants. generally speaking. appear to increase both host country imports 
from and exports to their respective home countries. However. considerable variation is 
observed across host countries in terms of pro-trade effects. For example. the magnitudes of 
immigrant-trade links for Denmark and Norway – both of which have fewer immigrants than 
other host economies considered in this study – are generally positive but also tend to be 
below-average when compared to the remaining host economies in our sample. Australia. 
Canada. Germany (with immigrant populations of typical size relative to the full sample of 
host countries) and the US (with the largest number of immigrants). on the other hands. 
frequently are estimated to have immigrant-trade links that are above-average in magnitude. 
We also report that greater cultural difference between host countries and home countries 
inhibits both host country imports and exports. with imports seemingly affected to a greater 
extent. This is consistent with the notion that greater cultural differences between societies 
complicate interactions. hinder the development of rapport and trust and. thus. act to inhibit 
trade flows. Greater cultural diversity of the host countries’ populations. on the other hand. 
corresponds with increased magnitudes and incidence of statistically significant immigrant-
export and immigrant-import effects. This suggests that where populations are more diverse. 
there may be increased likelihoods that the native-born populations and immigrants from 
other countries are more tolerant of distinct cultures and more open to altering their 
consumption. partaking in products from a given immigrant groups’ home country. It also 
may indicate that greater diversity correlates with a higher probability that the host country 
will afford immigrants the opportunities that allow them to reduce trade-related transaction 
costs. 
That immigrants increase trade flows by exploiting superior information regarding host 
country markets (relative to their home country counterparts) and home country markets 
(relative to their host country counterparts). while cultural differences inhibit trade flows 
implies that immigrants play greater roles in facilitating international flows than is usually 
discussed in the literature: fully or partially offsetting the influences of lack of trust and 
commitments that correspond to cultural differences between potential trading partners; thus. 
initiating trade and facilitating transactions. 
 
 
APPENDIX: COUNTRY LISTING 
 
Albania. Algeria. Argentina. Armenia. Australia. Austria. Azerbaijan. Bangladesh. 
Belgium. Brazil. Bulgaria. Canada. Chile. China. Colombia. Croatia. Czech Republic. 
Denmark. Dominican Republic. Egypt. El Salvador. Estonia. Finland. France. Germany. 
Greece. Hungary. Iceland. India. Indonesia. Ireland. Israel. Italy. Japan. Jordan. Korea. 
Latvia. Luxembourg. Macedonia. Mexico. Morocco. Netherlands. New Zealand. Nigeria. 
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Norway. Pakistan. Peru. Philippines. Poland. Portugal. Romania. Russian Federation. Slovak 
Republic. Slovenia. South Africa. Spain. Sweden. Switzerland. Tanzania. Turkey. Uganda. 
Ukraine. United Kingdom. United States. Uruguay. Venezuela. Vietnam. Zimbabwe. 
 
 
APPENDIX:  
IMMIGRANT STOCK DATA AND ESTIMATE CONSTRUCTION 
 
Host Stock data available Inflow data available Source 
Australia 1996, 2001 1996-2001 Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Canada 1996, 2001 1996-2001 Statistics Canada 
Denmark 1996-2001 n.a. Danmarks Statistik 
Germany 1996-2001 n.a. Statistiches Bundesamt 
Italy 1996-2001 n.a. Istituto Nazionale di Statistica 
The Netherlands 1996-2001 n.a. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 
Norway 1996-2001 n.a. Statistisk Sentralbyrå 
Sweden 1990, 1999-2001 1990-1999 Statistiska Centralbyrån 
USA 1996-2001 n.a. US Census Bureau 
 
Due to a lack of available data for immigrant stock values. it is necessary to estimate 
immigrant stock values for the years 1997-2000. for Australia and Canada. and for the years 
1996-1998 for Sweden. Available immigrant stock values are accepted as correct and are 
employed as benchmark values. We then use inflow data to estimate immigrant stocks for all 
other years. For example. immigrant stocks for Australia. for the years 1997-2000. are 
constructed as . is the immigrant inflow from home 
country j to host country i (in this case. Australia) during year t.  is an adjustment factor 
accounting for return migration and deaths of immigrants during non-benchmark years. The 
adjustment factor is the immigrant stock from home country j in Australia during 2001 less 
the sum of immigrants from country j in Australia in 1996 and the inflow from country j 
during the years 1997-2001 divided by five:  . For 
Canada and Sweden. immigrant stock variables are estimated similarly.  
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